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Abstract 
 
This paper presents Léon Walras and Augustin Cournot views on 
monetary regulation. Important differences can be found in their views 
about the convenience of the issuing of paper money and fiat money in 
general. Whereas Walras is against bank notes, even if coming from a 
central bank, Cournot has a moderate position. He accepts the need for 
bank notes even without a strict adjustment to metal reserves. It can be 
ascertained that Cournot believes discretionary monetary regulation is 
convenient and acceptable, while Walras believes the only acceptable 
monetary system is one based exclusively on the stability of the value of 
money under a monetary rule following the strict equivalence between 
metallic reserves and a pure medium of exchange form of money. This 
paper shows Cournot’s ability to understand more clearly than Walras 
the evolution of the monetary system of his days. Whereas Walras is 
trying to guarantee the coherence of his pure theory with his applied 
theory, and he is then unable to accept the evolution toward a monetary 
system based on fiat money and he proposes very rigid and complex 
system of quasi-bimetallic circulation where banks are simple mediators 
between entrepreneurs and savings. 
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Introduction 
 
The second half of the XIXth century is a period of great transformations in 
monetary history. The crisis of metallic systems and the expansion of fiat 
money are some of the salient events of the time. In the particular case of 
the French monetary system, the most significant issue, from 1848 until the 
end of the century, was the expansion of the Bank of France and its 
consequent de facto monopoly of note issue to the entire national territory2 
and some periods of non convertibility. Even with an important expansion 
of Bank of France’s paper-money under Napoleon’s First Empire the 
French monetary system was far from the development of the paper-money 
circulation attained by England or even by northern European countries.  
 
The period of the “Parisian monopoly” of the Bank of France was followed 
by a short period of a more free legislation on the creation of private banks 
from 1866 until 1873, when it was brutally stopped by a succession of 
political and monetary crisis. As a result, the French banking system fell 
behind compared with similar countries. This relative underdevelopment of 
the banking system is also related with a general feeling of apprehension of 
French people about non-metallic money and a succession of monetary and 
social crisis during the first half of XIXth century. However, the main 
intellectual debate, in France, on monetary matters around the second half 
of that century became the instauration of a system of free banking3 against 
a paper-money monopoly in the hands of the Bank of France. A group of 
very influent policy makers, opinion-makers and professional economists 
revived the defense of laissez-faire systems of bank money issue. In the 
meanwhile in England, the well known debate between the so-called 
banking and currency schools finished with the triumph of the latter, 
                                                 
2
 In 1803 Bonaparte gives the Bank of France the monopoly of note issue for the Parisian region only while 
there were an important number of regional banks issuing notes. But regional paper money never acquired 
national circulation, not because of a legal reason, which eliminated only the Parisian competitors of the 
Bank of France, but because of their lack of “credibility” outside their original region. See (Wolowski, 
1864, pág. iii) and (Davies, 2002, págs. 555-567). 
3
 Some authors sustain there existed a period of free banking in France before 1803, however, as has been 
said, regional paper-money had very restricted circulation whereas  the Bank of France’s paper money had 
a broader circulation beyond the Parisian. 
Documento EE No 12 
 
 
 P
 
 
imposing a very conservative policy on the Bank of England concerning 
paper-money supply.  
 
In this context a theoretical revolution was taking place in economics: the 
so called Marginal Revolution. Two significant French authors emerge, one 
as a forerunner and another as a main figure of this intellectual movement: 
Augustin Cournot and Léon Walras. As most of the authors of the Marginal 
Revolution they devoted a lot of intellectual effort and produced some ideas 
on monetary theory. However, even their contributions were directed to 
participate in the crucial monetary debates of their time, they occupied a 
particular place beyond the pure applied issues on the management of 
money supply.  
 
They participated in those debates as pure theoreticians and as 
revolutionary thinkers. They were stood upon their solid theoretical 
frameworks. However, accepting that they agreed on their views regarding 
those fundamental matters and neglected the historical changes is losing 
sight of the theoretical richness that springs from the differences between 
them in particular pertaining monetary issues. In what follows, I try to 
bring forth this theoretical richness analyzing the positions of these great 
French economists on paper-money.  
 
The changes in the economy had an important influence on their own 
theoretical contributions to the transformation of economics. Nevertheless, 
most of the analysis on these authors has focused on their theoretical 
positions. Their contributions aside from pure theory came to be 
considered, in the best of cases as pure theoretical speculation, and most of 
the time as a minor part of their works. Little attention has been given to 
their views on economic policy and economic regulation. In particular, 
regarding the regulation of the monetary system, Walras and Cournot, in 
spite of their proximity in economic and monetary theory, have very 
different stands. Their greatest differences can be found in their views 
about the convenience of the issuing of paper money and fiat money in 
general. Whereas Walras is against bank notes, even if coming from a 
central bank, Cournot has a more moderate position. He accepts the need 
for bank notes even without a strict adjustment to metal reserves. It can be 
ascertained that Cournot believes discretionary monetary regulation is 
convenient and acceptable, while Walras believes the only acceptable 
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monetary system is one based exclusively on the stability of the value of 
money under a monetary rule following the strict equivalence between 
metallic reserves (bimetal to be exact) and circulating money.  
 
This paper aims at bringing forth the reasons that explain this difference as 
a result of the interpretation each one of the authors gives to the empirical 
facts of the monetary system taking place at the end of the XIXth century. 
These facts produce diverging developments in each author’s theoretical 
positions. Walras consolidates an extreme position based on the view of 
money as a commodity, the value of which is determined as the price of the 
service of a necessary capital good that assures the circulation of 
commodities. This good monetary circulation needs to be differentiated 
from the circulation of bank issued paper-money which lies at the origin of 
deep real crises through an evil cumulative process distorting economic 
equilibrium and most importantly economic justice.  
 
Cournot, on his side, conceives money as something in-between a 
commodity and an institution and makes no special difference between 
bank issued paper-money and metallic money. This view is most evident in 
his two non-mathematical economic works published in 18774 which 
consolidate his position regarding the need and the desirable effects of the 
existence of paper money, already present in his 18635 work but absent 
from his well-known mathematical theoretical work from (Cournot, 2001 
[1838])6. 
 
I will show the difference between these two thinkers and will evidence 
Cournot’s ability to understand more clearly than Walras the evolution of 
the monetary system of his days. Walras, instead, trying to guarantee the 
coherence of his pure theory with his applied theory, is unable to accept the 
evolution toward a monetary system based on fiat money. This paper then 
aims at contributing to the differentiation of the authors of the so-called 
Marginalist School, underlining, once again, the richness of the Marginalist 
                                                 
4
 Revue sommaire des doctrines économiques (Cournot, 1982 [1877]), henceforth Doctrines. 
5
 Principes de la theórie des richesses (Cournot, 1863), henceforth Principes.  
6
 It is worth to notice that this last work had an important influence on Walras, who uses it for his own 
analysis about the determination of the value of money. In fact, in the second edition of his EEPP the 39
th
 
lesson concerned the analysis by A. Cournot of the absolute and relative values and in particular on the 
fluctuations of the value of money. 
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period and questioning the commonly accepted view of the homogeneity of 
their ideas. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: in the first section I consider Walras’s 
approach to the problem of bank issued paper-money as a theoretical 
construction founded on his pure economics. A critical exposition of his 
pure theory of money is thus needed before the theory of banking is 
analyzed. The second section reconstructs Cournot’s main ideas on money 
and paper-money as they were developed in his non-mathematical 
economic works. Then, in a third section I present an evaluation of the 
main differences between both authors viewed against the monetary 
debates of their time. 
Walras’s desideratum for pure metallic-money and the 
threatening character of paper-money 
 
Walras’s analysis of “circulation” takes us directly from the abstract world 
of pure theory to a highly practical reality. In fact, Walras considered 
money as a pure practical object not necessarily having its place within his 
pure economics. However, the evolution of his monetary theory shows how 
money becomes an integral part of his Élements d’économie politique pure 
(henceforth EEPP) (Walras, 1988) having its place as the closing device of 
his whole model. The introduction of a decentralised exchange process 
implies breaking with the centralised (i.e. well organised) form of the 
tâtonnement sur bons. Beyond this methodological change, it is interesting 
to note that Walras adds some novelties to the hypothesis of perfect 
competition in order to integrate his monetary theory. But this is high-risk 
chirurgical modification because its main goal is to avoid any disturbance 
of the normative properties of equilibrium allocations. 
 
However, monetary issues are related, even in the pure theoretical arena of 
his EEPP, to the possibility of economic crisis. In fact, we can say that 
Walras regards monetary circulation as the door to the introduction of 
natural endogenous sources of crisis, not only as the artificial crisis created 
by a bad public intervention. Some authors have underestimated the 
importance of this “devil inside” feature of monetary circulation in Walras’s 
monetary works. The common view on the walrasian notion of crisis is 
summarized by this kind of statement: 
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Perfectly in line with the century-old Classical tradition, and of 
course with the other marginalist contributions to cycle theory 
(notably those by Jevons, Marshall, and Menger), a crisis is 
considered as a short-run, temporary oscillation around a long-run 
`natural' equilibrium determined by `real' variables only.  (Bridel, 
1997, p. 49) 
 
Even if this is true for the Walras’s early (1860’s) works, his studies on 
money and banking led him considering crisis are not only part of a short-
run oscillation triggered only by “real variables”7. In his Mathematical 
Theory of Bank Notes (henceforth TMBB8) Walras presents paper-money 
as a dangerous threat for the real economy: Monetary causes of real crisis. 
This feature makes most of Walras’s scholars admit TMBB as proof of the 
deep differences or even incompatibility between his pure and applied 
economics9. It is precisely on these grounds that I will try to reconstruct an 
appraise Walras’s attempt to theorize money under its different forms and 
in particular to disentangle his radical stance against any form of paper-
money circulation. 
1.2. The nature of money in Walras’s Pure Economics 
We have to take a short detour by Walras’s pure theory of money in order 
to understand the particular nature of paper-money issued by private 
banks. In his EEPP, after a lot of transformation across different 
editions10, lesson 29 exposes a general equilibrium analysis of the 
circulation of money. Beyond the problems11 this analysis could have, our 
interest here is on the economic nature of money.  
 
As has been often discussed, the epistemological structure of Warlas’s 
economics is based on the division and interaction between pure and 
applied economics, the EEPP is the main contribution and synthesis of his 
pure economics12. This relation is complex but putting it in a nutshell one 
can say that pure economics represents the ideal functioning of an 
                                                 
7
 Baranzini presents a clearcut analysis of this evolution of Walras’s ideas on crisis (Baranzini, 2001) 
8
 Théorie mathématique du billet de banque (Walras, 1992) : originally presented in 1879 before the Sociéte 
Vaudoise des sciences naturelles. 
9
 See (Baranzini, 2001), (Bauvert, 2004), (Kuenne, 1961) and (Hilton, 1995). 
10
 See (Bridel, 1997) and (Rebeyrol, 1998) for detailed expositions and discussions on the evolution of 
Walras’s monetary thought. 
11
 In a paper coauthored with V. Bignon we exposed a critical discussion on Walras’s monetary theory 
(Alvarez & Bignon, 2004). 
12
 See Jaffé (1983) 
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economy where commutative justice is respected. This simply means that 
no agent is able to profit from any form of economic power, for example 
imposing a monopoly price. This assumption is materialized in the 
hypothesis of price-taking as the basement of perfect competition. 
 
But Walras goes beyond the idea that perfect competition assures 
commutative justice (or putting it in modern terminology: Pareto 
efficiency). He introduces other implicit conditions that must be fulfilled in 
order to assure that a general equilibrium state coincides with a fair 
allocation, from the commutative justice point of view. Money appears 
related with one of these conditions in a twofold sense. First, because 
money is necessary in order for a decentralized exchange economy to attain 
final (equilibrium) allocations from an initial endowment situation. 
Second, and more crucial here, because the process of exchange or the 
circulation of wealth needs to be neutral regarding the real equilibrium 
allocations. Money must be neutral and the quantity theory rule must hold. 
This is the result Walras struggled upon along different versions of his pure 
monetary theory. 
 
In this ideal framework, money is a particular object allowing to solve 
synchronization between payments and earnings. Demand for money is 
only motivated by a problem faced by consumer agents (mainly workers): 
their expenses take place before they receive their earnings. On the other 
side, entrepreneurs need to have enough money to cover their circulating 
capital expenses. Both type of agents demand money provided it is a 
generally accepted medium of exchange.  
 
Money demand is thus based on a simple technological social problem for a 
decentralized economy. Even if Walras’s explanation is different from the 
typical “absence of double coincidence problem”, the rationale for 
monetary circulation is essentially the same: money is demanded as 
medium of exchange and no other reason is needed. However, Walras 
introduces a confusion in this theoretical analysis of the nature of money. 
He presents the stock of money as a form of capital held by agents: 
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Note the inclusion of money as an asset yielding saleable services; 
since one sells the services of money for one “week” by lending, 
Walras' money economy is of necessity one with borrowing and 
lending, and the coexistence of money and a loan market in it a 
requisite. (Kuenne, 1961, pág. 96) 
 
The quantity of money that is needed to circulate the entire wealth for a 
given period is therefore established in the real sphere. It is the solution to 
the general equilibrium price quantities vectors that solves the necessities 
of circulation. Off course, Walras recognized that a unit of money can be 
used in a sequence of different payments, but this velocity of circulation is 
taken as given and the obvious quantity theory formula (equation de la 
circulation) holds. The consequence of the nature of money as a particular 
form of capital is dismissed by Walras and he concentrates his argument on 
the nature of the instantaneous availability service of cash holdings, rather 
than on the intertemporal feature. However, as I will show further on, this 
subterfuge cannot last for long as he needs to confront more realistic forms 
of money, in particular the bank issued paper money. 
 
Walrasian pure monetary theory thus results in a very traditional 
conception of the effects of the quantity of money on nominal prices. They 
are related in a positive manner. What is more important for our purposes 
here, money supply is given and exogenous all along this theoretical 
exposition and money is not a commodity. These last features of Walras’s 
pure monetary theory are of great importance.  
 
Concerning the non-commodity character of money, even if the monetary 
circulation of his pure economics is not bank issued paper-money, one can 
understand that he searched to establish a very general theory of monetary 
circulation, not only of the circulation of a particular commodity. The 
crucial challenge raised here is to explain why an object without intrinsic 
value or real demand can circulate as pure medium of exchange. Walras, as 
we have seen before, solves this puzzle problem giving a great importance 
to the desynchronization of payments. In any case, money is not demanded 
because of a pure financial reason or because of its capacity to preserve 
value in the medium or a long term. In the EEPP money is not a creature 
of financial markets. This leads us to the other interesting feature just 
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mentioned: money supply is determined by an endogenous demand for 
money. This means that no endogenous creation of the monetary object is 
considered but the quantity necessary to assure the circulation of the real 
product is endogenously determined. Money is a part of the initial 
endowments of some agents and Walras only makes some simple analyses 
of comparative statics concerning the quantity of money in circulation. 
These analyses are always related to non-explained exogenous shocks. 
When a different quantity of money is considered, the adjustment variable 
is the price of the services as medium of exchange furnished by money. Any 
expansion on the initial money holdings of agents produces a decrease on 
the price of that service and a consequent rise of prices in terms of money. 
 
After considering the case of a non-commodity form of money, Walras 
concludes the 30th lesson of EEPP with a short but very important analysis 
of commodity money. The reasoning is obviously directed towards a theory 
of the variations on the price of metallic-money. The main conclusion, not 
surprisingly, stated by Walras is that there exists a natural tendency of the 
real price of the commodity (in his commodity market) to equalize the 
purchasing power of its monetary form (i.e. coins). The regulation of the 
value of money in a metallic system needs to take into account the real 
price theory: scarcity and utility being the main forces behind. 
1.3. The nature of metallic-money in Walras’s Applied 
Theory of a bimetallic system 
 
The summit of Walras’s attempt to defend the neutrality of money, not only 
theoretically but also concerning applied economics is condensed in two 
propositions: The necessity for a bimetallic monetary system and the 
abolition of bank issued paper-money. Concerning the former13, it is the 
consequence of his main conclusion about the positive relation between the 
quantity of money and its purchasing power and the historical events 
Walras faced, namely the depreciation of gold and the instability of the 
price of silver related to an increase in its international supply. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 The latter proposition (i.e. the abolition of paper-money) gather our whole attention in the next 
subsection. 
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According to Walras the object of any monetary policy is to assure the 
stability of the price system and to avoid the introduction of a cumulative 
speculative crisis. Either, deflationary or inflationary spirals lead to a 
distortion of the price mechanism and in fine of redistributive effects 
distorting the market allocations. If a price system is working properly, that 
is to say under perfect competition, the resultant price vector guarantees 
commutative justice. Any redistributive effect is undesirable, provided 
there is no other normative argument on distributive justice14. In 
particular, money-gold or money-silver holders are exposed to fluctuations 
on their purchasing power when external shocks on gold and silver markets 
are experimented by the economy, while the debtors reduce the amount of 
their debts.  
 
Thus, if a metallic system is the best way to ensure the stability of the 
monetary supply, this system has drawbacks because of the instability of 
the prices of gold and silver as commodities. The, sometimes regarded as 
very curious, system proposed by Walras to avoid those negative 
consequences of a pure metallic system consist in the adoption of a quasi 
bi-metallic system based on the circulation of gold species joint with the 
possibility to introduce a secondary form of species, named “regulator-
billon” made in silver, when gold-money becomes scarce (either because of 
an “exportation” of the metal or an increasing use of it as a industrial 
input)15. Walras presents this system as a very rigid rule to maintain price 
stability. A rule that can even be mathematically established and given to 
the State in order to apply it. Walras insists on the necessity of the 
intervention of the State in monetary matters, contrary as he says, to “the 
dominant tendency towards laissez-faire” (Walras, 1992, pág. 11) of his 
time. He defends a permanent intervention based on mathematical rules. 
That is the deep spirit of Walras’s monetary policy.  
 
The mono-metallic system with a quasi bimetallic regulation, other than its 
evident complexity, is a clear evidence of the nature of money Walras 
defended: the only form of money that is necessary for the economic 
                                                 
14
 Walras deals with those distributive issues in his works on “La question sociale” (Walras, 1990) and 
(Walras, 2001) 
15
 « Le monométallisme-or combiné avec un billon d’argent distinct de la monnaie divisionnaire et qu’on 
introduirait dans la circulation ou qu’on en retirerait de manière à ce que le prix de l’étalon multiple ne 
variât pas » (Walras, 1992, pág. 5) 
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system to work properly (perfect competition) is a stable metallic medium 
of exchange. Money supply must be regulated and stabilized and monetary 
policy needs to guarantee that the quantity of money in circulation does not 
exceed the necessities of the real price system derived from the general 
equilibrium equations.  
 
However, historical reality is against Walras’s plans. The existence of a de 
facto bimetallic circulation and most important the increasing part of 
paper-money and other forms of payments are a stinging truth Walras 
understood well:  
 
It is a curious fact, and worth to be noticed concerning monetary 
theory, that it has been considered as a first progress to adopt money 
and, when it exists, to consider as a second progress to withdraw it. 
There are in fact an important number of instruments of payment, 
whose importance is ever increasing, without the intervention of 
metallic money. Those are: (…) Credits on books, (…) Exchange 
letters, (…) Bank notes (…). (Walras, 1988, pp. 517-519)16 
 
The actual monetary circulation is composed of different forms of money. 
But what can be said, from a theoretical point of view, about those monies? 
That is the central question Walras is trying to tackle with his apparently 
purely applied analysis of bank issued-money. We have now the elements 
to understand the second stronghold of Walras’s monetary policy: the 
abolition of the bank-issued paper money.  
 
1.4. « Théorie appliqué du billet de banque »: A theory for 
monetary policy  
 
So far, I have studied the pure theoretical nature of money as exposed in 
the EEPP and the more applied features of the nature of metallic money. 
Both aspects are strongly related within Walras’s propositions concerning 
the abolition of paper-money. I shall show that this radical posture against 
any form of circulation other than his quasi bimetallic system is based on a 
difficulty of his pure economics and the necessity to solve it when he 
develops his applied arguments. 
 
                                                 
16
 My translation and emphasis. 
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Walras formulated the central question of his TMBB as pure policy matter:  
 
The production of bank notes ought to be made by the State, or by a 
unique bank endowed of monopoly power conditioned to a strict 
agenda, or by an undetermined number of free banks? (Walras, 1992, 
p. 311)17 
 
It is worth noting that Walras explicitly considered the difference between 
an independent and a government controlled central bank. The policy issue 
at stake is not only the traditional debate on free banking or monopoly. 
Most of the French participants on this debate (contemporary to Walras18) 
centered their positions on a twofold option: free-banking vs. central bank. 
The latter being either a public or a private institution. By recognizing the 
difference between a central bank guided by government changing policies 
and one guided by a strict rule (i.e. cahier de charges) Walras acknowledge 
the importance of the debate held in England between the banking and the 
currency school. However, his answer is very original regarding both forms 
of the debate. Walras declares a radical opposition against any form of 
paper-money putting in this way the problem in a different ground: the 
theoretical discussion on policy matters.  
 
I have noted at the beginning of this exposition on Walras’s theory that his 
exposition of a pure theory of money has tried to avoid any reference to the 
capital nature of money holdings. Monetary demand, in the pure 
theoretical exposition, is determined as a result of the necessity of a 
medium of exchange in order to assure the circulation of the real value of 
production. Money supply is thus given by money demand and, I can state 
it now, artificially established by an equilibrium equation of the money 
service market from which can be automatically obtained the price of 
money in terms of a numéraire commodity. Facing this feature of Walras’s 
theory of money, some scholars have interpreted it as an incompatible 
theory of monetary supply. Following Bauvert (2004), the general 
coherence of Walrasian monetary theory is threatened by an exogenous 
                                                 
17
 My translation. 
18
 One of the most important groups of intellectuals advocating in favor of free banking during the second 
half of the XIXth century in France is related to the Journal des Économistes (Molinari, Guyot, Bastiat, 
Chevallier)  
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money supply in his EEPP that would be incompatible with an endogenous 
money supply of the TMMB. Even if this is apparently true, as it could be 
derived from what has been said so far in this text, I have a slightly 
different interpretation.  
 
Walras’s exposed his radical opposition against any form of fiat money in 
different places of his pure and applied texts. A common trait of this idea, 
that is present even before the development of his TMBB, is that there 
cannot exist a particular commodity or any other object serving as an 
invariable standard of measure of value19. The reason for this is simple: 
values are in fine determined by subjective elements (subjective scarcity 
and preferences) and the very idea of an objective standard of measure is 
incompatible with a subjective theory of value. Nonetheless, the deep 
nature of money as pure medium of exchange cannot be separated from its 
use as a standard of value. If every commodity is to be exchanged against 
money, the actual vector price of the economy is naturally established in a 
nominal form (in terms of money). However, Walras always tried to avoid 
this practical evidence by proposing an interesting difference between the 
commodity serving as numéraire (commodity A in his notation) and the 
object serving as medium of exchange (commodity U in his notation20). 
This later being, as I already said, a pure medium of exchange without any 
other private utility. This implies this object can only change its value, 
following Walras’s theory of prices, according with its quantity. Any 
subjective source of value taking a part, the monetary object of the pure 
economics is obviously neutral and quantity theory holds. This is Walras’s 
theoretical artifice needed to expose his ideal type system in his pure 
economics. The conclusion is thus that money supply needs to be adjusted 
to its demand as medium of exchange if any general perfect competition 
equilibrium, with the normative properties of it, is to be attained.  
 
Any perturbation of the supply quantity will trigger an increase of the 
service of availability of money in terms of a numéraire commodity and a 
consequent diminishing purchase power of money. A last consequence of 
this conception is that money supply needs to be equal to the medium of 
exchange demand and the actual price of money in terms of a numéraire 
                                                 
19
 See the original 29th lesson of the second edition of the EEPP where he criticized Cournot’s conception 
of an “absolute” measure of value. 
20
 See (Walras, 1988, p. 449) 
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becomes a theoretical tautology. This price is determined by a very simple 
quantity theory equation and the whole nature of the stock of money as 
form of capital or a support for savings is neglected. But Walras knew and 
made it explicit, with his characteristic academic honesty, that the applied 
monetary questions pushed him to abandon the hypothetical conception of 
a fixed supply of money. 
 
When the applied theory of money is exposed, the very nature of money as 
a particular form of capital returns to the front of the scene. Walras is 
confronted to a very hard problem: all forms of intraperiod media of 
exchange are forms of capital from an interperiod point of view. The 
exchange instruments have different forms according to its support as 
capital. An important question arises here: why did Walras not include this 
analysis in his pure economics? The answer, according to us, is this: any 
demand for money as a form of capital opens the door to redistributive and 
expectational distortions. These distortions lead to an allocation which is 
different from those which are Pareto optima (or in terms of Walras to 
distortion of commutative justice). 
 
This interpretation would seem contradictory with the conceptual 
framework Walras built in order to introduce money within his value 
theory. That is, an intertemporal framework with capital goods and 
savings. Walras even establishes a demand for money as a form of capital. 
Money holdings (encaisse désirée) appears to be a form to conserve wealth. 
Walras also considers that in pure theoretical situation the whole capital 
takes a monetary form and it is borrowed by entrepreneurs21. Money 
capital and capitalists savings are identical. Workers’ and landowners’ 
savings are also monetized. But, when Walras establishes the money supply 
for an individual he presents it as being the total quantity of money from 
the last period (savings) minus its own demand as medium of exchange and 
savings for the next period. Adding for all agents, and given a fixed quantity 
of money between periods, we can note that in equilibrium the whole 
monetary demand is zero because the whole supply of money for a given 
period can only be the amount of savings from the last period: 
                                                 
21
 It is important to remember a particular theoretical difference established by Walras: Entrepreneurs are 
the direct producers, they search to maximize benefits choosing an adequate technique and inputs; 
Capitalists are the owners of capital, consumers and not producers, lending its capital goods or monetary 
capital to entrepreneurs and earnings the price or the loan for it. 
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The left side being the net monetary demand for the actual period (t) and 
the right side the total money supply of the actual period. From which 
results a nil gross demand for the actual period: 
 
 
The mistake made by Walras is due to a flaw definition of the money 
supply. In fact, when he considers the way an entrepreneur get money in 
order to pay its input costs other than labor, Walras only considers the case 
of capitalists lending money to them by the intermediation of a bank. But 
the banks are a pure device to transfer capitalists deposits (savings) to 
entrepreneurs. At the end of the period the entrepreneurs have received the 
necessary quantity of money to repay capitalists and workers by means of 
their sales. In a stationary state situation, money plays a pure role of 
medium of exchange transferred between periods (interperiod) in order to 
realize payments during a given period (intraperiod). But what all this has 
to do with banks and paper-money? The answer to this question is actually 
the explanation of Walras’s main concern about the perils of paper-money.  
When banks are considered from the point of view of pure economics but 
on the grounds of applied economics, Walras defines them as a particular 
form of entrepreneurs, with a profit maximizing logic. Being more than a 
simple automatic booking and money transfer system, as they are as long 
as pure economics is considered, now the banks have a private economic 
logic that threatens the whole economic system: the capacity to create a 
new money supply.  
 
This capacity is carried out by banks when they go beyond the intermediate 
function and they create themselves a new demand for economic projects. 
As has been mentioned above, Walras establishes two distinct categories of 
agents: capitalists and entrepreneurs. The supply of capital goods, of in fine 
of capital money, is the main role of the formers. Entrepreneurs create 
products or services and maximize profits by means of sales and 
technological decisions. The problem with banks is they are “monster” 
considered from the point of view of this categorization of agents. When a 
bank decides to lend money to an entrepreneur supported upon no 
capitalist demand, they are, not only increasing money supply, but also 
 COMPARATIVE VIEWS ON L. WALRAS AND A. COURNOT ON THE REGULATION OF 
PAPER MONEY: RULES VS. DISCRETION AT THE END OF  
THE XIXTH CENTURY. 
 
  
P
ág
in
a1
9
 
“artificially” creating a demand for capital. The banks are playing a double 
role as entrepreneurs and capitalists: 
 
It is needed to go further than Coquelin and declare that paper 
money issued by banks pushes the limits of credit by allowing banks 
and bankers to lend money to entrepreneurs without any capitalist.  
(…) The issue of bank notes up to an amount leads to the increase of 
the same amount of capital. (Walras, 1992, p. 319)22 
 
The entire predictions of pure economics model of money, as exposed in its 
last version in the EEPP, are jeopardized. In fact, Walras put this problem 
in terms of a question: which is the difference between metallic and paper 
money? His answer is this:  
 
[The difference is twofold]: First, metallic money has a value in itself, 
while bank notes only represent the value of the capital goods they 
will be traded for, and they have no value when those capital goods 
lose their value; second, after having lent their metallic money for the 
first time the banks and bankers are in a way compelled to lend it 
anew indefinitely, otherwise this value would be idle, whereas the 
possibility to lend paper money again depends upon people’s will. 
(Walras, 1992, p. 320) 
 
This increase in capital made by banks issuing paper money means an 
increase in the capacity of entrepreneurs to buy more capital goods but the 
production of new capital goods in order to satisfy this demand takes time, 
says Walras (Op cit. p.321). During this, the only effect is a “nominal” 
increase in the means of payments and a consequent depreciation of the 
price of the whole money supply including metallic money23.  
 
He thinks the increase in capital goods price disappears as their supply 
equals their demand the loan is paid back, but the depreciation of metallic 
money persists. Walras’s explanation is as follows: the increase in money 
supply (paper and metallic) reduces the price of money by a simple effect of 
excess supply. The real price of metallic money lowering it is then 
converted in commodity metal (i.e. gold for the industrial gold market) and 
then the price of this commodity shrinks. Agents exchange gold for paper 
                                                 
22
 My translation. 
23
 Do not forget that Walras believes in a pure quantity theory of money. 
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money at the bank and bank issue money paper replaces metallic money as 
long as the total amount of metal goes out monetary circulation. Beyond 
this point, an inverse movement takes place. This is the ancient bouillons 
theory of “gold points”.  
 
But the novelty of Walras’s argument relies upon the particular character of 
banks as entrepreneurs and artificial- capitalists. If the the production of 
new capital goods to satisfy their demand leads to an increase not only on 
the demand for capital goods but also of land and labor. Labor and land 
being inelastic goods, they become more expensive and workers’ and 
landowners’ savings increase. This savings are transformed in a form of 
capital less liquid than the paper money issued by banks. This quite 
complex reasoning leads Walras to consider that paper money is 
transformed in fine in less liquid assets than metallic money. But what 
about bankers? The argument above leads to the conclusion that paper 
money tends to naturally replace metallic money. Walras considers metallic 
money as the most liquid asset, because it is the only generally acceptable 
medium of exchange. Bank notes are always subject to uncertainty and 
even when they circulate as medium of exchange, the time of a real or 
financial crisis will show an important difference between paper and 
metallic money (Walras, 1992, p. 338).  Bank notes being less liquid than 
metallic money, it is, following Walras, impossible to transform, as fast as 
required, paper money into metallic money. Furthermore, as the central 
part of the argument is that paper money replaces pure liquid capital by 
less liquid capital, the bankers are always promising something they cannot 
afford.  
 
Walras explains also that this argument against paper money holds 
whether there is free banking or a monopolist central bank. This also holds 
even if there is perfect competition in the banking system or a very rigid 
rule imposed to a central bank. Walras considers that paper money opens 
the door to a too important number of distortions of the exchange system 
and those distortions are unavoidable.  
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1.5. Walras’s monetary regulation: no Central Bank please, 
we need a strict rule! 
 
Even if the complex arguments exposed by Walras to present such an 
extreme conclusions present some flaws, my main interest here was to 
show that his rejection of any paper money circulation is constructed upon 
theoretical arguments directly derived from his pure economics framework. 
In fact, the problem with banks is not their capacity to profit from their 
particular position as creators of money and capital. That is to say, the 
arguments against banks is not based on a violation of the commutative 
justice as is the argument against natural monopolies (Walras, 1992). In 
the case of monopoly, the main concern of Walras is the capacity of those 
agents to impose their will by means of their market power. Natural 
monopolies must be nationalized, as it is clearly stated by him concerning 
railways and land. But banks are not by nature monopolists because 
competition among paper money is perfectly possible. Walras quotes 
Coquelin and other famous enthusiasts of the free banking system. He even 
published some papers in the Journal des économistes himself. He admits 
the possibility of competition among banks to keep them producing 
reasonable amounts of paper money.  
 
The issue, following Walras, is to be tackled from a different point of view. 
Allowing paper money circulation leads to the introduction of an in internal 
source of perturbation. A real variable (i.e. an entrepreneurial activity or a 
supply of paper money matching a real demand in case of a Central Bank) 
opening the door to a distortion of equilibrium results and of the stationary 
system of the EEPP.  
 
Every form of fiat money represents the same risk for the economy. The 
only monetary system guaranteeing general equilibrium perfect 
competition allocations without introducing the possibility of endogenous 
crisis is a system based on a commodity money, and in particular a quasi-
bimetallic system regulated by a very strict rule of circulation. This means, 
Walras did not support a Central Bank producing paper money but he 
actually proposes a system of monetary circulation with a permanent 
intervention of the State according to a very strict mathematical rule. No 
place for discretionary policy is given to this monetary authority. But this is 
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not a Central Bank capable to produce paper money, but a regulation 
authority of the market for gold and silver which must be confound with 
the market of money. The goal of this authority is to maintain a stable price 
of it through a permanent mechanism of monitoring and intervention. This 
is similar to the function of modern Central Banks regulating a fixed 
exchange rate. 
 
We are now able to compare these very complexes arguments of Walras 
with the much more simple and “realistic” form of Cournot’s analysis. 
Cournot: Paper Money regulation as a matter of “bon sense” 
 
Cournot’s monetary theory is not to be found in his first and most known 
work from 1838 (Cournot, 2001 [1838]). This well known piece is his main 
contribution to a mathematical price theory. But, even there, some 
important points are made about money. In the chapters on “absolute 
value” (chapter 2) and “exchange rate” (chapter 3) we found the corner 
stone of Cournot’s theory of the nature of money as a human institution 
necessary to the progress of human industry. After that general 
considerations, Cournot studies the determination of the price of metallic 
money though an algebraic exposition of the well known theories of reflux 
and “gold points”. At the end of Chapter 3 he remits the reader to Adam’s 
Smith work on exchange rate and metallic money price. This is not 
sufficient to found a complete and original monetary theory.  
It is not needed thus to be said that Cournot’s monetary has been almost 
completely neglected compared to his price theory. The only reference to its 
monetary theory is made by Loiseau (1913). In his doctoral dissertation this 
author recognizes the main importance given by Cournot to the study of 
money but in particular to the analysis of credit and the banking system as 
a natural, necessary and critical evolution of the “industrial” system. This is 
my starting point. 
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1.6. From a static price theoretical framework towards a 
long-term institutionalist dynamic analysis: Cournot’s 
economic works from 1838 to 1877 
 
The real interesting and original analysis on monetary matters by Cournot 
are presented in his two last economic works (Cournot, 1863) and 
(Cournot, 1982 [1877]). It is interesting to note an intellectual history 
aspect of this. These two pieces are completely free from the mathematical 
language of the first one. In the preface of both works Cournot explains that 
he is trying to catch the attention of a lager public, given the very limited 
success of his first book, he attributes to the mathematical language. 
However, another reason explaining the absence of mathematics from the 
last two works is given by Cournot in a letter to Walras published by 
Etienne Antonelli in Econometrica (Cournot, Walras, & Jevons, 1935, págs. 
119-120). Cournot describes his physical incapacity to read and write 
mathematics because of a very hard vision trouble forcing him to use a 
reader boy since the 1830’s.  
 
This remark is not worthless for our purpose because it allows explaining 
not only why Cournot tries to rewrite in a non-mathematical language his 
economic theory but because it explains the great difference concerning the 
subjects Cournot’s analyses in his last two works and the way he did it. 
These two works are as rigorous as his mathematical work. They take 
without significant change his main theoretical model of price 
determination from the 1838 book. However, those works also suggest a 
more mature intellectual production. The possibility to go further the 
mathematical language allows him to propose follow more complex and 
realistic argument. But the long period between the first and the second 
one (almost 30 years later) allowed him to rethink and most important to 
read a lot of new economics. This last element is more important 
considering his last work (1877) which has been written as a last theoretical 
statement with the confident sentiment of a triumph of his original idea of 
a mathematical and marginalist economic theory.  
 
Those mature works present in particular a theory of long-term economic 
dynamics. This is the main difference related to the first one. In this 
dynamic context, Cournot develops an appraisal of the role of money in the 
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history of economic evolution. His views on money are thus determined by 
a historical conception. But this long term scope is also completed with 
very practical and contemporary debates. In particular, Cournot addressed 
the questions on free banking and on the regulation of non-metallic money.  
From the long-term historical point of view Cournot presents the evolution 
of human economy from a primitive rural economy towards the 
industrialized one. Money or, better said, the means of payments system, 
naturally evolves from a very simple one, allowing few trades among 
agricultural almost autarkic units towards a very complex financial system 
and fiat-money.  
 
Let’s put it briefly (…), first let’s recognize that the notion of exchange 
of one material object against another material object (…) is a very 
concrete one. But the function of a numéraire or of coinage leads, by 
virtue of language and by the impulse of human mind, to consider an 
idea of value that is at a higher level from the point of view of mental 
abstraction, in a stronger relation with human reason and law. It 
seems very simple to understand that the peoples at the origin of 
arts, sciences and jurisprudence have also been at the origin of the 
institution of money within the economic system (Cournot A. , 1982 
[1877], pág. 89)24 
 
Cournot’s thought on the nature of money is well summarized in this 
quotation. His is an institutionalist view of the origin and evolution of 
money. If he recognizes that every single rural economy provided they 
realize even a few trades need to use a common standard of value and that 
this role is naturally given to a particular commodity, he also conceives the 
economic transformations and progress of societies needed the 
development of credit, metallic money and paper money. Those are 
creatures of the human mind not of nature. The abstract character of paper 
money and financial instruments is the pinnacle of this institutional 
development. These elements are initially introduced by a profit 
maximizing action of some agents, but they need of public powers to 
stabilize themselves and to work properly. This is the theoretical 
background for Cournt’s analysis of paper money. A very different one 
compared to Walras’s theory of the nature of money produced in order to 
complete his pure theoretical system. 
                                                 
24
 My translation. 
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1.7. Cournot and the natural propensity towards a fiat 
money system 
 
It is now clear that Cournot conceived paper money as part of an ongoing 
evolution of the payment system. However, this evolution is not a straight 
monotonic line of permanent and positive progress. On the contrary, the 
raise and evolution of paper money is a source of some evil. In particular 
when the political power abuses of it. Cournot, in a very equilibrated and 
realistic way, presents the origin of paper money as a result of the natural 
needs of a society whose population and wealth is increasing. This is a 
characteristic of industrial societies not of the rural stationary ones.  
Technological development, capital accumulation and division of labor are 
the basement of economic growth. Those elements cannot flourish within a 
pure metallic monetary system. The reason is quit paradoxically. Metallic 
money was historically adopted because of his natural stability and stable 
supply. However, the “needs of circulation” of industrial societies are ever 
changing. Crisis and booms are strongly tied to industry. Agricultural 
societies are exposed to climatic change, but industry is exposed to human 
creativity (op. cit. p. 43).  
 
Following Cournot, the stability of a monetary standard is as chimerical as 
the stationary state of an industrial society. For this reason, an institutional 
agreement on an “artificial” standard of value is compulsory to the 
industrial progress: 
 
Once one has admitted that metallic money25 is not a fixed standard 
of value, that it is exposed to real fluctuations, not only on his relative 
purchase power but on its own absolute value, it is a natural thing 
that men conceived the idea of a money of account in order to deal 
with the alterations on the value of precious metals. (…) So doing, 
men have not acted in a metaphysical way (…)  
The instauration of a money of account, as reasonable and fair as it 
seems when its goal is to better the conditions of measuring values 
avoiding the variations of the value of metals (…), becomes an 
harmful institution, a source of trouble for the ideas and human 
conscience, (…) (Cournot A. , 1982 [1877], pág. 68) 
 
                                                 
25
 Cournot uses the word “argent” (silver and money in French) in order to designate any form of metallic 
money (1982 [1877], pág. 67). 
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Cournot conceives the use of money as a source to finance government 
expenses, as in war times, and the abuse of political power is the drawback 
effect of the positive progress related to non-metallic money. This is a 
common trait of his general views on money and monetary regulation: a 
permanent oscillation between good and evil, between crises and 
prosperous periods. This is the spirit of a discretionary regulation of the 
monetary system by the State provided it is made within reasonable limits.  
1.8. Banks, Paper-money and Monetary Policy: three 
necessary evils 
 
When the story told by Cournot about the evolution of payment systems 
arrives to the point of the consolidation and spread of paper money, the 
same moderate standpoint dominates his arguments. Paper-money is a 
necessity but its value is unstable. Government intervention is needed in 
order to set up a common standard value and to regulate its production. 
Banks provide credit instruments and so doing create paper money of 
generally accepted. It is because it is necessary for the economy that paper 
money becomes not only a substitute for metallic money but an integral 
part of money supply. Cournot stands on a very different position than 
Walras: paper-money is not only impossible to differentiate from metallic 
money for the common sense but also from a pure theoretical point of view. 
Trying to establish a difference is going against the very nature of the 
payment system: a necessary device for the well functioning of an industrial 
economy.  
 
(…) money is money, a sui generis thing, and it is no more a bill of 
exchange than a commodity, but it has some affinities with both. 
(Cournot A. , 1982 [1877], págs. 89-90) 
 
The way the government ought to regulate the functioning of the monetary 
system depends on the particular circumstances. Banks lend money and 
create paper money according to a necessity. Walras could agree so far with 
Cournot. However, Cournot considers that this is a source of growth and of 
progress. But this must be handled very carefully. Cournot argument is 
condensed in the following quotation:  
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With good judgment and wisdom on the administration of paper-
money issue, always harmonizing as possible the quantity according 
to the real circulation needs, Government can balance the things in 
order to maintain more or less stability of the price of paper money: 
provided that, on its side, the population keeps their natural common 
sense from the excess of either panic or infatuation. (Cournot A. , 
1863, pp. 263-264) 
 
It is interesting to note that Cournot refers to inconvertible and legal-
tender paper money issued by a monopoly bank (i.e. Bank of France). We 
the usual warnings, he considers that there exist some limits within which 
inconvertible paper-money does not harm the economy provided a fine 
dose of common sense (bon sense) of both Government and private agents. 
Cournot does not provide exact formulas for the bon-sense of monetary 
policy. He considers intuition and observation of the ongoing situation of 
the economy are more accurate than sophisticate mathematical theories.  
1.9. Inconvertible Paper-Money vs. pure metallic money 
Cournot introduces a similar argument to the one Walras’s uses to explain 
the consequences of an exaggerated supply of paper money. This argument 
is based on the well known mechanism of of gold price as a regulator of 
metallic money price:  
 
The Bank can make use of this power to stimulate, to increase 
general production or the movement of enterprises and business, as a 
far as a shrink on the value of money (either metallic or paper), and 
as far as to trigger a commercial crisis if the movement it produces is 
too abrupt. To say that bank notes, issued beyond the circulation real 
needs, will come back to the bank in order to redeem them, is to 
suppose the public confidence has already been demolished. 
Otherwise, why taking paper money back to the bank rather than 
buying metallic money? (Cournot A. , 1863, p. 253) 
 
Contrary to Walras, Cournot states the possibility of good consequences of 
the increase in paper money supply within the limits of public confidence. 
He conveys modification of money supply will destabilize nominal prices 
and thus the purchasing power of money. However, he also recognize that 
it is impossible, under the actual conditions of technology and economic 
knowledge, to implement a better monetary system.  
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Cournot refers to a bimetallic system, very similar to the one imagined by 
Walras, and arrives to the conclusion that it is for sure an ideal system, as a 
philosophical matter, but:  
 
The double metallic standard is the less easy to handle for any 
Government, because it implies the difficult task of permanent 
screening and correction of gold and silver prices and frequently 
modifications the official rates as soon as it becomes far enough from 
commercial rates. How could the Government accept the enrichment 
of a speculator on the harmful consequence for the Country (…)? And 
How could the Government impose to his people the obligation of 
receiving a commercially devaluated value as their payments? 
(Cournot A. , 1982 [1877], pág. 80) 
 
The permanent threat of speculators is a reality as well for the metallic 
money as for the paper-money. The implementation of a stable monetary 
standard is a main concern, but a pure metallic system implies a too hard 
task and too strict policies. It is, from this practical point of view, an 
undesirable system. 
 
Governments have other mechanisms in order to maintain as stable as 
possible the circulation of paper money. Legal tender is one and Cournot 
also considers the importance of taxation and public expenses as one of the 
main forms to assure paper money circulation. Under difficult economic or 
political conditions, Government takes the reasonable decision to stop 
convertibility. How could it be possible to avoid panic and a confidence 
crisis on paper money? The answer is to maintain a stable demand for it. 
Legal tender is an acceptable policy when panic or any unreasonable 
psychological reason is at the origin of a depreciation of convertible paper-
money. Cournot is extremely clear on this matter: 
 
A trouble, a suspension of convertibility from the Bank, shall be a 
cause of depreciation of bank notes. And as it is impossible to 
distinguish the limits between those psychological phenomena 
named fright and panic, the depreciation could goes to the complete 
failure of fiat money, if government did not have the possibility to 
take one of these two measures: one consisting on accepting them as 
tax payments at its nominal price, the other consisting on compelling 
legal tender for bank notes at their entire nominal value. This last 
solution is by far more adequate in order to allow fast and smooth 
overtaking of a crisis: because for every agent the liabilities and 
payments are taking at the same nominal value. (Cournot A. , 1982 
[1877], pág. 76) 
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The economic rationale for legal-tender policies is clear: stability of the 
contracts is assured by a common restriction affecting debtors and lenders 
in the same way. The imposition of the payment of taxes and public fees in 
paper money is another possibility to support paper money circulation but 
Cournot also acknowledges that this is a dangerous policy because it opens 
the door to Government manipulation. In any case, Cournot recognizes and 
economically justifies monetary policies that Walras would reject because 
they are a dangerous threat for the commutative justice of a market 
economy. Cournot considers monetary policy as a service public (1863, p. 
200), needing to be ruled with caution but also discretionary. 
Concluding remarks: Walras, Cournot and the currency school vs 
banking school debate 
 
These two important theoreticians produced very original reflexions on 
monetary matters compare the main concerns of monetary debates of their 
time. The historical and intellectual context to which belong Walras’s and 
Cournot’s monetary analyses were dominated by the banking vs. currency 
schools debate on central banks, on the one hand, and by the free banking 
vs. central bank divide on the other. These two debates had common points 
and they were related to theoretical views on money. The central issue at 
stake in both debates was the definition of money and if paper money and 
credit instruments could be considered as part of that definition or if only 
metallic currency could. Most of the arguments were given in terms of 
liquidity or solvability risk of fiat monetary forms.  
 
Walras’s monetary policy is not easy to classified using those debates as 
criterion. We can say that Walras is opposed to both free banking and 
central banking. He is in fact opposed to monetary creation by banks. He 
acknowledges the importance of financial developments, of stock markets 
and credit. However he considers those developments a permanent source 
of danger for the stability of a perfect competitive general equilibrium 
system. His opposition is not based on a simple denial of the central role of 
banks in a dynamic economy but on the possibility to let the banks, guided 
by their well founded self-interest, to disturb economic prices. This 
argument is based on a very interventionist conclusion: the natural 
function of a free financial and credit market is dangerous for a market 
economy. The financial system must be strictly regulated and the system of 
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payments must be kept of financial fluctuations. His quasi bimetallic 
system is based on strict rules and permanent intervention of the State in 
order to assure the distinction between finance and credit on the one hand 
and money on the other hand. Monetary circulation needs to be a neutral 
device of the economic system.  
 
The walrasian point may not be understood as Currency School principle. 
Walras proposition is much more extreme and the only similar idea that we 
can find in Irving Fisher’s 100% Money (Fisher, 1997 [1935]). According to 
this proposition banks became simple mediators between real production 
and savings (Diatkine, 2002, pág. 151). This is the exactly the theoretical 
explanation of the significance of Walras’s proposition. I have tried to show 
that it tries to avoid a difference between the theoretical role of banks at 
work in the EEPP and the real role of them. From the pure economics 
point of view, Walras presents banks as simple deposit banks not creating 
any new form of currency other than a mechanical transfer of monetized 
savings into monetary capital borrowed by entrepreneurs. But, when his 
applied theory considers banks, he is forced to recognize the capacity of 
banks, as entrepreneurs, to create new forms of currency. This is a source 
of perturbation and instability. This is what Walras is trying to avoid.  
 
Cournot develops very realistic and midway appreciations on the financial 
developments of his time. He did not present banks or credit or finance as a 
danger but as consequence of progress. However, paper-money and 
banking could be a source of instability: a necessary evil. Cournot did not 
analyze the case of free-banking, he was always taking as given the 
existence of a Bank, a central Bank. He warned about the risks of this 
monopoly but never proposed to eliminate the monopoly but to keep its 
functioning reasonable limits. He compares the Bank of France with the 
Bank of England on the handling of crisis and the instauration of legal-
tender. He concludes the latter was better managing because legal tender 
was imposing with good timing and retired when necessary, whether the 
Bank of France was permanently exposed to the arbitrary influence of 
Government and legal tender was an instrument to abuse of it. 
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This makes very difficult to put Cournot’s monetary thinking on one side or 
another. He did not developed an argument “100%” in favor of metallic 
money, but he considered metallic money having good stability provided 
paper-money acts as a complement. Any form of credit, fiat money or 
financial innovation is regarded by Cournot as related to the ever 
increasing necessities of industrial societies. His long-term views on the 
historical evolution of economic systems allows him to present those 
elements at the same level as arts, literature, technology, etc …  
 
Cournot always considered practical solutions. Easy to implement and 
always trying to avoid the temptation of too complicated “scientific” 
propositions on monetary matters. Those “philosophical utopia will always 
be overtaken by reality” he ponders (Cournot A. , 1863, p. 246). This could 
be his message to Walras. 
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